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The Role of Indefinite Detention 
in Antiterrorism Legislation∗ 
 There is considerably less to be proud about, and a good deal 
to be embarrassed about, when one reflects on the shabby 
treatment civil liberties have received in the United States during 
times of war and perceived threats to its national security. 
 For as adamant as my country has been about civil liberties 
during peacetime, it has a long history of failing to preserve civil 
liberties when it perceived its national security threatened. . . .  
After each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has 
remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was 
unnecessary.  But it has proven unable to prevent itself from 
repeating the error when the next crisis came along. 
—William J. Brennan, Jr.1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The repercussions of September 11, 2001 (9/11), were felt not only 
here in the United States, but also around the world.  In the wake of the 
attacks, similarly sweeping antiterrorism laws were rushed through both 
the American and British legislatures with little debate.  In the United 
States, a vague joint resolution of Congress allowed for the detention of 
both citizens and noncitizens captured abroad in combat zones without 
the ability to challenge their sentences.  Likewise, in the United 
Kingdom, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), 
until its revision last year, allowed for the indefinite detention of 
noncitizens certified as terror suspects by the Home Secretary.2  In both 
countries, the opportunity for judicial review of a suspect’s detention was 
(and to some extent still is) limited or nonexistent. 
                                                     
 ∗ Richard Raimond.  I would like to thank the staff and board of the Kansas Law Review for 
their assistance getting this Comment into shape, Mark Mosier for his invaluable comments and 
suggestions, and my wife, Ellen, for just being her. 
 1. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest To Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times 
of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 11 (1988). 
 2. National security in the United Kingdom is the province of the Home Department.  The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department more commonly is referred to as the Home Secretary. 
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Since the laws passed, however, cases have arisen in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom in which the government detained people 
for more than two years only to release them without charge.  In the 
United States, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld3 
prompted the government to release Yaser Esam Hamdi to Saudi Arabia 
without charge in October 2004.4  Later that same year, the British House 
of Lords ruled that the ATCSA’s detention provisions were incompatible 
with Britain’s commitments to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), and the government announced that the provisions 
would be replaced.5  Since that ruling, however, the July 2005 bombings 
in London have prompted the introduction of a further set of terrorism 
laws.6 
Although Hamdi and others eventually were released, their releases 
came only after months of detention—and future detainees may not fare 
as well.  In both countries, cases involving the hastily assembled laws 
have found their way to the courts on a case-by-case basis, with little 
consensus between rulings as to how to apply the law.  Despite fierce 
criticism, the U.S. government’s policy in particular seems to be largely 
reactionary: making the minimum changes necessary as and when 
adverse court decisions are handed down, while still attempting to keep 
suspects detained indefinitely.7  This ad hoc approach is justified on 
grounds that both the Joint Resolution and the ATCSA were intended in 
large part as temporary measures for times of emergency only.  Britain’s 
previous experience with domestic terrorism belies its temporary nature, 
however, with a series of supposedly temporary antiterrorism provisions 
being extended indefinitely over a longer period of time.8  Even if there 
                                                     
 3. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 4. Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court, Will Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
23, 2004, at A1.  The U.S. government has also released a number of other, lower-profile detainees.  
See, e.g., 38 Guantanamo Detainees to be Freed After Tribunals, FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING 
HOUSE CBS NEWSWIRE, March 30, 2005, available at 2005 WL 735527 (detailing the release of 
thirty-eight detainees found not to be “enemy combatants”). 
 5. Vikram Dodd et al., Freed Britons Sent Home: Clarke Unveils House Arrest Plan for 
Terror Suspects, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 27, 2005, at 1 (detailing the release of four Britons 
released from Guantanamo without charge). 
 6. Tony Blair, U.K. Prime Minister, Remarks at Downing Street Press Conference (Aug. 5, 
2005) (transcript available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1543385,00.html). 
 7. See Dana Priest, Long-Term Plan Sought for Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2005, at 
A1 (“The Pentagon and the CIA have asked the White House to decide on a more permanent 
approach for potentially lifetime detentions, including for hundreds of people now in military and 
CIA custody whom the government does not have enough evidence to charge in courts.”). 
 8. See Sir David Williams, The United Kingdom’s Response to International Terrorism, 13 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 683, 687–89 (2003) (detailing the enactment and subsequent renewal of 
various British antiterrorism provisions). 
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is a foreseeable end to the War on Terror, it may be a long time in 
coming, and to simply detain people for the duration will amount to a life 
sentence without trial.9 
This Comment will argue for the need for revised antiterrorism 
legislation based on three main principles.  First, any legislation should 
be designed as a permanent measure to recognize that the War on Terror 
is an ongoing situation, and that short-term gains in matters of national 
security need to be balanced against the ongoing erosion of civil rights.  
Second, the legislation needs to allow for the detainees to meaningfully 
challenge the grounds for their detentions before neutral decision makers.  
Finally, the legislation should not discriminate between detainees purely 
on the basis of nationality, and it should allow noncitizens the same 
opportunity to at least challenge their sentences as citizens, while 
conversely giving the government similar powers to use against citizen 
terrorists as against those who are noncitizens. 
Part II of this Comment charts the United States’ past experiences in 
dealing with rebels and enemy saboteurs operating outside the traditional 
rules of war, while still generally managing to maintain sight of the 
Constitution and the right to habeas relief.  To demonstrate how under-
prepared, reactionary legislation has a tendency of becoming the norm, 
Part II also examines Britain’s legislative attempts directed at domestic 
terrorism.  Part II also examines more recent cases from both countries to 
show how detention without trial has been a very real problem in both 
the United States and United Kingdom. 
Part III then evaluates present approaches before concluding that 
present legislation, both temporary in nature and cobbled together from 
existing law, is singularly unsuited to dealing with the problem of 
international terrorism.  Part III then attempts to synthesize and expand 
on recent rulings to present an integrated and coherent approach to the 
capture and detention of terror suspects. 
                                                     
 9. Even President Bush has stated that the War on Terror may not be winnable.  Speaking on 
NBC’s Today Show, Bush stated, “I don’t think you can win it.”  Aides sought to contextualize 
Bush’s statements by claiming that Bush was acknowledging that there would not be a conventional 
surrender or signing of treaties to signal an end to the war.  Richard Benedetto, Democrats Leap on 
Terror War Remark, USA TODAY, Aug. 31, 2004, at 6A. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Emergency Powers of Detention in the United States Before 9/11 
The use of executive power to override customary civil liberties 
dates back to at least the Civil War.  In 1861, Lincoln suspended habeas 
corpus, empowering himself to arrest “disloyal” citizens (i.e., 
Confederate sympathizers) without giving them access to the courts to 
challenge their detentions.10  At least one court held this presidential use 
of executive power unconstitutional,11 but Lincoln and the military, 
riding popular opinion, ignored the courts.12  Two years later, Congress 
authorized similar future suspensions of habeas corpus without directly 
legitimizing, but effectively condoning, Lincoln’s previous 
proclamations.13  When the war ended, the transition back to regular 
democracy was somewhat shaky.  In 1864, an Indiana man was arrested 
for sedition and sentenced to death by a military tribunal.14  The Supreme 
Court heard his habeas petition and held that because the military 
commission was not a court vested with judicial power by Congress, it 
had no right to charge a civilian.15  The Court stated that the exigencies 
of wartime may justify the suspension of certain civil liberties but that 
they should be restored as soon as possible: 
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow 
that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct 
conclusion of a purely judicial question.  Then, considerations of safety 
were mingled with the exercise of power; and feelings and interests 
prevailed which are happily terminated.  Now that the public safety is 
assured, this question, as well as all others, can be discussed and 
 
                                                     
 10. Melissa K. Matthews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President 
Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 455, 465 (2002). 
 11. Id. (quoting Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (“I 
can see no ground whatever for supposing that the President, in any emergency, or in any state of 
things, can authorize the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus . . . .”)).  Notably, 
popular sentiment was against the Merryman decision, as reflected in an editorial from the New York 
Tribune, which stated that “[t]he Chief Justice takes sides with traitors.”  Brennan, supra note 1, at 
13–14. 
 12. See Matthews, supra note 10, at 466 (stating that Lincoln “blatantly ignored this ruling”). 
 13. An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, 
Ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). 
 14. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6–7 (1866). 
 15. Id. at 40. 
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decided without passion or the admixture of any element not required 
to form a legal judgment.16 
The Court’s message was clear: it was willing to overlook executive 
suspension of habeas corpus during brief periods of national emergency, 
but should the government try to retain these powers past the end of the 
emergency, the courts would enforce the Constitution. 
During the Second World War, the Supreme Court again upheld the 
executive’s power to detain people charged with no wrongdoing on 
grounds of national emergency.  More than 10,000 people of Japanese, 
German, and Italian ancestry were forced from their homes and sent to 
relocation centers along the West Coast.17  During this same period, the 
Court upheld the executive’s decision to try German soldiers who had 
entered the country on a sabotage mission by closed military tribunal.18  
The Court reaffirmed that Congress had acknowledged military 
commissions as courts of military law with jurisdiction over all military 
matters and held that the petitioners therefore had no right to a jury 
trial.19  It was also in this case that the Court first drew the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful combatants.20  This distinction would again 
be used by the Court in deciding the Guantanamo Bay cases.21  Only in 
one instance did the courts decline to hear detainees’ habeas petitions 
entirely.  Twenty-one German citizens, convicted of war crimes, were 
held in a U.S. prison in occupied Germany following the end of World 
War II.  The Court declined to hear their petitions because they were not 
U.S. citizens, had never set foot on U.S. soil, were not detained in the 
United States, and had been tried and convicted by a military 
commission.22 
                                                     
 16. Id. at 109. 
 17. Danielle Tarin, Note, Will an Attack on America Justify an Attack on Americans? 
Congressional and Constitutional Prohibitions on the Executive’s Power to Detain U.S. Citizens as 
Enemy Combatants, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 1145, 1155 (2004).  In Hirabayashi v. United States the 
Court sustained the conviction of an American citizen of Japanese ancestry for violation of a 
militarily imposed curfew.  320 U.S. 81 (1943).  A year later, in Korematsu v. United States, the 
Court upheld an order preventing people of Japanese, Italian, or German ancestry from entering an 
“exclusion zone.”  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 18. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 19. Id. at 28–29. 
 20. Id. at 31.  “Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by 
opposing military forces.  Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in 
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their 
belligerency unlawful.”  Id. 
 21. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 514–16 (2004). 
 22. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950).  The Court set out six criteria to be met 
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More recently, following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA).23  The AEDPA provided enhanced immigration 
procedures mandating the detention of aliens illegally present in the 
country who had been convicted of a felony.24  Prior to this act, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could exercise discretion 
in deciding whether to detain the alien pending deportation.25  Once 
detained under the act, the noncitizen’s right to habeas was limited to a 
determination of whether the petitioner was an alien, and whether he 
could prove he had been legally admitted.26 
B. Developing Antiterrorism Law in the United States Since 9/11 
Since 9/11, a series of cases have made their way through the courts 
challenging the President’s assertions that terrorists, as enemy 
combatants, can be detained indefinitely without any recourse to either 
the civilian or military courts.  Courts generally have been split on how 
to balance on the one hand concerns of national security and deference to 
the President in his role as Commander in Chief, and on the other 
individual human rights—primarily the right to liberty.  Reversals 
between the district and circuit courts have been frequent, as have splits 
between the circuits.  The Supreme Court has decided several cases 
involving people detained under the Joint Resolution, but its decisions 
necessarily are limited to the cases before it, and even then its holdings 
are subject to further interpretation by the district courts on remand. 
                                                                                                                       
before such a detainee could be denied habeas relief.  The detainee: 
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured 
outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was 
tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for 
offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times 
imprisoned outside the United States. 
Id. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
tit. 8 of the United States Code). 
 24. Id. § 439, 110 Stat. at 1276 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2003)). 
 25. Dana Keith, In the Name of National Security or Insecurity?: The Potential Indefinite 
Detention of Noncitizen Certified Terrorists in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 
Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 405, 421–22 (2004). 
 26. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (2003). 
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1. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force and Detention Order 
Within a week of 9/11, Congress passed a Joint Resolution granting 
the President the authority 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent 
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
such nations, organizations or persons.27 
Shortly thereafter, pursuant to this Joint Resolution, the President 
issued an order authorizing the Secretary of Defense to detain anyone the 
President had “reason to believe” (1) was a member of Al Qaeda; (2) had 
engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of terrorism; 
or (3) knowingly harbored such a person.28 
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
In the weeks following the Joint Resolution, the President sent troops 
to Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime that harbored Al 
Qaeda.29  The Northern Alliance, a coalition of anti-Taliban forces, 
seized Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen,30 and handed him over to the 
U.S. military.31  Hamdi initially was transferred to the American base at 
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, but when the government learned of his 
citizenship he was transferred to a naval brig in Charleston, South 
Carolina.32  The government contended, under the standard established in 
Ex parte Quirin,33 that Hamdi was an “enemy combatant” and as such 
 
                                                     
 27. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  This 
was the first time in American history that the use of force was explicitly authorized not just against 
other states, but also against “persons.”  Michael J. Glennon, Forging a Third Way to Fight: “Bush 
Doctrine” for Combating Terrorism Straddles Divide Between Crime and War, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2001, at 68. 
 28. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
 29. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
 30. Id.  Hamdi was born in Louisiana, and thus was a U.S. citizen, although his family had 
moved to Saudi Arabia while Hamdi was still a child.  Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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could be held indefinitely without charge and without access to 
counsel.34 
In June 2002, Hamdi’s father filed a habeas petition on Hamdi’s 
behalf, contending that, as a U.S. citizen, Hamdi’s detention without 
access to counsel was illegal and in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.35  Hamdi’s father contended that his son had been in 
Afghanistan doing relief work and that he had been in the country only 
for two months before 9/11, which would not have allowed him enough 
time to receive military training.36  The district court appointed counsel 
and ordered that he have access to Hamdi.37  On appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed, holding the district court failed to defer adequately to 
the government’s security and intelligence interests.38  The Fourth 
Circuit urged the district court to “‘consider the most cautious procedures 
first’” in conducting a suitably deferential review of Hamdi’s status.39 
On remand, the government presented a declaration from Michael 
Mobbs, a special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.40  
Although he had never met Hamdi, Mobbs stated he was familiar with 
the military’s detention procedures and had personally reviewed the 
records concerning Hamdi’s capture and detention.41  Mobbs reiterated 
the government’s evidence for Hamdi’s detention.  According to Mobbs, 
Hamdi had traveled in July or August 2001 to Afghanistan where he had 
received weapons training by the Taliban.42  Hamdi then fought against 
the Northern Alliance forces, to which he subsequently surrendered, 
turning over his assault rifle when he did so.43  When handed over to 
American troops, Hamdi allegedly admitted in interrogation that he had 
“entered Afghanistan the previous summer to train with and, if 
necessary, fight for the Taliban.”44  As a result, Hamdi was classified an 
enemy combatant.45 
                                                     
 34. 542 U.S. at 510–11. 
 35. Id. at 511. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 512. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 40. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 533 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th 
Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 534. 
 43. Id. at 535. 
 44. Id. at 534. 
 45. Id. at 535. 
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The district court found that Mobbs’s declaration fell “far short of 
even [the] minimal criteria for judicial review.”46  The court criticized 
the vague, hearsay nature of the declaration and concluded that it led “to 
more questions than it answers.”47  The court ordered the government to 
turn over evidence of both the military’s screening procedures and 
records of Hamdi’s statements for in camera review so that a proper 
determination of the legality of Hamdi’s detention could be made.48 
The government appealed the production order and the district court 
certified the question of “whether the Mobbs Declaration, standing alone, 
is sufficient as a matter of law to allow a meaningful judicial review of 
[Hamdi’s] classification as an enemy combatant.”49  The Fourth Circuit 
again reversed, holding that: 
[b]ecause it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active 
combat in a foreign theater of conflict . . . the submitted declaration is a 
sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the Commander in Chief 
has constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the war powers 
entrusted to him by the United States Constitution.  No further factual 
inquiry is necessary or proper.50 
The court further found that the Joint Resolution “necessarily 
include[d] the capture and detention of any and all hostile forces arrayed 
against our troops” thus giving the President explicit congressional 
authority to detain enemy combatants, including U.S. citizens.51  Finally, 
the court rejected Hamdi’s argument that his status as an American 
citizen detained on American soil should affect the result.  Relying on 
the fact that one of the defendants in Quirin was a naturalized citizen, the 
court stated that “[o]ne who takes up arms against the United States in a 
foreign theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be 
designated an enemy combatant and treated as such.”52  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to hear Hamdi’s case. 
The Court began by determining the “threshold question . . . [of] 
whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as 
‘enemy combatants.’”53  In this, the Court sided squarely with the Fourth 
                                                     
 46. Id. at 533. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 528–29. 
 49. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 50. Id. at 459. 
 51. Id. at 467.  18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) states, “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 
 52. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 475. 
 53. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004). 
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Circuit and held that in passing the Joint Resolution, “Congress has 
clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow 
circumstances considered here.”54  The detention of enemy combatants, 
regardless of citizenship, was necessary “to prevent captured individuals 
from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again.”55 
The Court expressed concern, however, at the potential length of 
Hamdi’s detention.  Whereas conventional wars tend to last a few years, 
the unconventional nature of the War on Terror could mean that it 
stretches on for several generations.56  As a result, “Hamdi’s detention 
could last for the rest of his life.”57  The Court sidestepped this issue, 
however, by noting that “[a]ctive combat operations against Taliban 
fighters . . . are ongoing in Afghanistan” and, as such, “[t]he United 
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals 
legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who ‘engaged in an 
armed conflict against the United States.’”58  In short, the indefinite 
nature of Hamdi’s detention would only become an issue following the 
outright defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Having established that the government was entitled to detain such 
enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities, the Court then moved to 
the issue of what review, if any, such detainees were entitled.  The entire 
Court agreed that, “absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains 
available to every individual detained within the United States.”59  More 
importantly, all agreed that the writ had not been suspended.60  The 
government urged the Court to adopt the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that, 
because Hamdi was seized in a combat zone, no further hearing or fact 
finding was necessary.61  The Court rejected this argument, noting that it 
could not be called “undisputed” where Hamdi had no real opportunity to 
contest his categorization as an enemy combatant.62 
Relying on the Mathews v. Eldridge63 test, the Court attempted to 
balance Hamdi’s “most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in 
being free from physical detention by one’s own government”64 against 
                                                     
 54. Id. at 519. 
 55. Id. at 518. 
 56. Id. at 519–20. 
 57. Id. at 520. 
 58. Id. at 521. 
 59. Id. at 525. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 526. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 64. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
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the “sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in 
fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against 
the United States.”65  Moreover, the Court took note of the government’s 
argument that military officers engaged in waging war abroad could not 
be “dangerously distracted” by litigation occurring at home and that 
discovery into military secrets would “intrude on the sensitive secrets of 
national defense.”66 
The Court found that neither the government’s proposed solution nor 
that proposed by the district court struck the “proper constitutional 
balance” between the executive’s security interests and Hamdi’s personal 
interests.67  The Court held that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge 
his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”68  This 
approach could still be tailored to allow flexibility to the government, 
however.  The Court stated that the government may rely on hearsay 
evidence in such a hearing and that there would be a presumption in its 
favor, albeit a rebuttable one.69  Once the government had put forth 
“credible evidence” of the detainee’s enemy combatant status, the burden 
would shift to the detainee to persuade with his own counter evidence.70 
The Court found that Hamdi’s treatment fell far short of this required 
standard of due process and that he was entitled to bring his evidence 
before a neutral decision maker, but left open the possibility that this 
standard could be met by “an appropriately authorized and properly 
constituted military tribunal.”71  Military regulations already provided for 
such process in prisoner of war cases, and because Hamdi had been 
detained in a combat zone, the Court’s earlier holding in Ex parte 
Milligan would not apply.72  Perhaps the Court’s most stinging rebuke, 
however, was that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President 
when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”73 
Rather than give Hamdi a hearing, however, the government decided 
it would be easier to release him to Saudi Arabia—where he also held 
                                                     
 65. Id. at 531. 
 66. Id. at 532. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 533. 
 69. Id. 533–34. 
 70. Id. at 534. 
 71. Id. at 538. 
 72. Id. at 521–22, 538.  In Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6–7 (1866), the Court held that a 
military commission did not have jurisdiction over a nonmilitary citizen. 
 73. Id. at 536. 
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citizenship—under certain conditions.74  The Justice Department claimed 
that the conditions of Hamdi’s release ensured the safety of the United 
States, but the decision to release him was seen widely as a defeat to the 
government’s assertions of its unlimited powers of detention during 
wartime.75  That the government was unable to build a case against 
Hamdi during the two years it detained him also casts doubt on the 
legitimacy of some of the other detainees’ sentences. 
3. Rasul v. Bush 
At the same time as the Court was deciding the rights of an alleged 
American citizen turned enemy combatant in Hamdi, it also was 
considering the rights of the noncitizens captured in Afghanistan and 
detained without charge at Guantanamo.76  In 2002, the petitioners filed 
various actions in district court challenging the legality of their 
detentions.77  Construing all the actions as habeas applications, the 
district court relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager78 and dismissed them.  In 
doing so it affirmed the government’s argument that “aliens detained 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States [may not] invok[e] a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”79  In short, the detainees could 
continue to be held indefinitely without charge and without access to the 
courts to challenge their sentences, so long as they were detained outside 
the United States.  The court of appeals affirmed.80 
The Supreme Court started from the premise that “Congress has 
granted federal district courts . . . the authority to hear applications for 
habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held ‘in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”81  
Citizenship was not a statutory requirement.  “‘[A]t its historical core,’” 
the Court added, “‘the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 
 
                                                     
 74. Lichtblau, supra note 4.  The government required Hamdi to renounce his American 
citizenship, imposed restrictions upon his travel within Saudi Arabia, and required him to report 
suspected terrorist activity, such as if someone tried to recruit him.  Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 77. Id. at 471. 
 78. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  See also supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 79. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United 
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466. 
 80. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1144. 
 81. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2000)). 
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reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that 
its protections have been strongest.’”82 
Although the government argued that Eisentrager should control, the 
Court distinguished the present case in several important respects: 
They are not nationals of countries at war with the United States . . . ; 
they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less 
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two 
years they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United 
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.83 
Though not located in the United States, “[b]y the express terms of 
its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises ‘complete 
jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may 
continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses.”84  
Noncitizen detainees at Guantanamo “no less than American citizens,” 
were entitled to bring their habeas petitions in federal court and 
challenge the basis for their indefinite detentions.85 
Unlike Hamdi, however, the government has chosen to release few 
foreigners, and the petitioners remain in indefinite detention while they 
attempt to bring their petitions in federal court.  This is proving more 
difficult than the Court’s ruling in Rasul would suggest, and the Court 
may again hear the issues initially raised in Rasul.  In one subsequent 
district court ruling, the judge held that the noncitizen Guantanamo 
detainees were not entitled to habeas relief, drawing the distinction 
between the petitioner’s ability to seek a writ of habeas in federal court, 
and his ability to obtain one.86  Less than two weeks later, another district 
court held that the Fifth Amendment applied to the Guantanamo 
detainees and that the government’s detention of them violated their due 
process rights.87  The government also is considering other methods of 
circumventing Rasul by transferring noncitizen detainees to prisons built 
and monitored by the United States in their countries of citizenship, 
ostensibly under the control of those nations.88 
                                                     
 82. Id. at 474 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 
 83. Id. at 467. 
 84. Id. at 467–68 (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. at 481. 
 86. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 323 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[I]n its own words, the Supreme 
Court chose to only answer the question of jurisdiction, and not the question of whether these same 
individuals possess any substantive rights on the merits of their claims.”). 
 87. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 88. Priest, supra note 7. 
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4. Rumsfeld v. Padilla 
Unlike Hamdi and the petitioners in Rasul, Jose Padilla was not 
captured in Afghanistan, but instead was arrested in 2002 in Chicago on 
a material-witness warrant in connection with the 9/11 attacks.89  Padilla 
initially appeared before a New York district court and was appointed 
counsel.90  Shortly thereafter, the President designated Padilla an enemy 
combatant because he was suspected of both being an Al Qaeda associate 
and trying to create a radiological dispersal device (commonly known as 
a “dirty bomb”).91  Padilla was transferred to a Navy brig in South 
Carolina and held in solitary confinement without charge and without 
access to a lawyer.92  The lawyer appointed to represent him on the 
material-witness warrant filed a habeas petition on his behalf in New 
York, and the case was brought before the district court.93 
The district court held both that the President had the authority to 
designate a U.S. citizen captured on U.S. soil an enemy combatant and 
that, so designated, the detainee could be held for the duration of the 
conflict with Al Qaeda.94  The indefinite length of the detention again did 
not trouble the court: “So long as American troops remain on the ground 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan in combat with and pursuit of al Qaeda 
fighters, there is no basis for contradicting the President’s repeated 
assertions that the conflict has not ended.”95 
The government did not try to argue, however, that Padilla had no 
right to a habeas petition.96  Instead it argued that “affording [Padilla] 
access to counsel would ‘jeopardize the two core purposes of detaining 
enemy combatants—gathering intelligence about the enemy, and 
preventing the detainee from aiding in any further attacks against 
America.’”97  The court allowed Padilla’s lawyer to present the habeas 
                                                     
 89. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 
(2004). 
 90. Id. at 571. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 569, 574. 
 93. Id. at 571. 
 94. Id. at 588. 
 95. Id. at 590.  To counter the argument that the indefinite nature of the detention made it the 
equivalent of a criminal sentence, the court analogized to Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), 
in which the Supreme Court upheld Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, which provided for 
civil commitment as a preventative measure for those likely to commit such acts.  Padilla, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d at 591. 
 96. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594. 
 97. Id. at 603. 
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petition, and it held that Padilla should be allowed access to counsel for 
this limited purpose.98 
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit found that “the President 
lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain 
American citizens on American soil outside a zone of combat.”99  
Moreover, Congress’s Joint Resolution did not provide the statutory 
authority necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a):100 
While it may be possible to infer a power of detention from the Joint 
Resolution in the battlefield context where detentions are necessary to 
carry out the war, there is no reason to suspect from the language of the 
Joint Resolution that Congress believed it would be authorizing the 
detention of an American citizen already held in a federal correctional 
institution and not ‘arrayed against our troops’ in the field of battle.101 
The court remanded with instructions to the district court to issue a 
habeas writ giving the government thirty days to release Padilla, unless it 
chose to transfer him to a civilian facility and bring criminal charges.102 
The government appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari, and the case was heard on the same day as Hamdi.  Although 
the Court sternly rebuked the government in Hamdi for trying to use a 
state of war as a “blank check,” Padilla’s case swiftly was dismissed on 
procedural grounds, and the case was not heard on the merits.  The 
district and appeals court both had concluded that Donald Rumsfeld, the 
Secretary of Defense, was the proper recipient of the habeas petition, and 
that, as such, New York’s long-arm statute gave the courts jurisdiction 
over him.103  The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that under 
the “immediate-custodian rule” the commander of the naval brig where 
Padilla was held was the proper recipient of the petition, and, as such, it 
should have been filed in South Carolina.104  The case was dismissed 
without prejudice, and Padilla again filed his habeas petition while 
remaining in detention. 
                                                     
 98. Id. The court further noted that “there is no reason that military personnel cannot monitor 
Padilla’s contacts with counsel, so long as those who participate in the monitoring are insulated from 
any activity in connection with this petition, or in connection with a future criminal prosecution.”  
Id. at 604. 
 99. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 100. See supra note 51 (listing relevant provision of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)). 
 101. 352 F.3d at 723. 
 102. Id. at 724. 
 103. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433 (2004). 
 104. Id. at 446. 
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The district court heard Padilla’s correctly filed habeas petition in 
February 2005.105  Although the government tried to analogize Padilla’s 
capture to Hamdi’s, the court stated that any attempt to compare the two 
was like trying to compare “apples and oranges.”106  While Hamdi’s 
detention arguably was necessary to prevent him from returning to the 
battlefield, Padilla already was being held on a material-witness warrant 
and presented no further threat to the United States.107  As such, his 
reclassification as an enemy combatant and removal from the regular 
criminal justice scheme was “neither necessary nor appropriate.”108  The 
court further listed a number of crimes with which the government could 
charge Padilla instead of holding him as an enemy combatant.109  Finding 
no grounds for Padilla’s continued detention, the court ordered the 
government to release Padilla within forty-five days.110 
The Fourth Circuit found that Hamdi controlled and reversed, 
holding that the AUMF gave the President sufficient power to detain 
Padilla.111  Moreover, Padilla could likewise continue to be detained until 
the end of “the conflict with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.”112  Before the 
Supreme Court could hear the case again, however, the government 
chose to criminally indict Padilla on charges of supporting terrorism and 
Padilla was transferred back into the Justice Department’s custody to 
await trial.113 
                                                     
 105. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 106. Id. at 685 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring)). 
 107. Id. at 686. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 691. 
 110. Id. at 692. 
 111. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005) (“As the AUMF authorized Hamdi’s 
detention by the President, so also does it authorize Padilla’s detention. Under the facts as presented 
here, Padilla unquestionably qualifies as an ‘enemy combatant’ as that term was defined for 
purposes of the controlling opinion in Hamdi.”). 
 112. Id. at 392. 
 113. Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, U.S. Charges Detainee in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
23, 2005, at A5. 
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C.  Emergency Powers of Detention in the United Kingdom Before 9/11. 
1.  Britain’s Relation to Northern Ireland and the “Troubles”: An 
Overview114 
To understand Britain’s experience of domestic terrorism, which is 
concerned largely with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), it is helpful 
first to examine briefly the history of Britain’s involvement in Northern 
Ireland.  For a substantial period of history, successive British monarchs 
have laid claim to Ireland, starting with Henry II’s invasion of Ireland in 
1170.115  To increase control over the island, successive monarchs 
granted plantations of land to the British nobility.116  Following Henry 
VIII’s formation of the Church of England, the imported landowners 
brought Protestantism to Ireland, clashing with the native Catholics and 
adding a dose of religious hatred to the already volatile cultural 
situation.117  Uprisings were frequent.118 
In 1801, an Act of Union was formed abolishing the Irish 
government and instituting direct rule from Britain.119  In 1916, an 
attempt by the Irish to throw off British rule, known as the “Easter 
Rising,” was met with savage reprisals and the uprising’s leaders were 
executed.120  The resulting War of Independence between British troops 
and the IRA lasted until a treaty in 1920 partitioned the island in an 
attempt to restore peace.121  The treaty split the island into the larger, 
independent Catholic Republic of Ireland in the South, and the Protestant 
North, which remained part of the United Kingdom.  The separation 
remains to date.122 
The split was far from a happy one, however.  Although the 
Protestant majority in the North desired to be part of Britain, the Catholic 
minority wanted to unite with the independent South.  Hatred continued 
to foment, leading to the reforming of the Provisional IRA toward the 
                                                     
 114. For a more detailed overview of the history of Northern Ireland, see CAIN Web service at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/index.html. 
 115. John Darby, Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay, in FACETS OF THE 
CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 15, 15 (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995). 
 116. Id. at 15–16. 
 117. Id. at 16. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 16–17. 
 121. Id. at 17. 
 122. Id.  See also Partition and the Birth of Northern Ireland, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ 
war/troubles/origins/partition.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (further detailing the history of the 
divide). 
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end of the 1960s and a campaign of violence against the British Army in 
Northern Ireland.123  The violence soon spread to the British mainland, 
and between 1968 and 1998, more than 3000 people died as a direct 
result of terrorism.124  Pursuant to a tentative ceasefire, the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998 brought the Catholic Unionists and the Protestant 
Loyalists together in an uneasy power-sharing agreement.125  By 2002, 
the cordiality had broken down and direct rule was reimposed from 
London.126 
2.  Emergency Powers of Detention in Northern Ireland and Britain 
In response to the ongoing violence in Ireland, the British Parliament 
enacted a series of temporary measures, in effect creating a dual-track 
criminal justice system with differing standards for terror suspects and 
“Ordinary Decent Criminals,” colloquially referred to as ODCs.127  The 
Detention of Terrorists Order of 1972 permitted anyone “suspected of 
having been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of 
any act of terrorism” to be detained for up to twenty-eight days.128  Under 
the regular criminal law, a suspect could be held for ninety-six hours at 
most.129  The 1972 order was supplemented the following year by the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (NIA).  It allowed 
for the establishment of so-called “Diplock” Courts in which terror 
suspects could be tried by a single judge, sitting alone under less 
stringent rules of evidence.130 
The foremost piece of antiterrorism legislation enacted in Britain 
during the next twenty years, however, was the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (PTA).  Although (as its name 
suggests) the Act was intended to be temporary in nature and was 
enacted to deal with a state of emergency, it was renewed annually 
without any real debate and even extended three times.131  The PTA was 
                                                     
 123. Darby, supra note 115, at 17–18. 
 124. Williams, supra note 8, at 689. 
 125. John Darby, Northern Ireland: The Background to the Peace Process (2003), http://cain.ulst. 
ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm#agreement. 
 126. Id. 
 127. PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY: PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF 
TERRORISM ACTS IN BRITAIN 4 (1993). 
 128. Jeremie J. Wattellier, Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from Europe, 27 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 397, 407 (2004) (citing Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) 
Order, Statutory Instrument (Northern Ireland 15) No. 1632, art. 4(1) (1972)). 
 129. HILLYARD, supra note 127, at 74. 
 130. Keith, supra note 25, at 427. 
 131. HILLYARD, supra note 127, at 4.  The PTA was updated in 1976, 1984, and 1989.  As well 
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based on the earlier Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1939 and the NIA, and extended the antiterrorism powers to the British 
mainland.  The Act gave the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) the power 
to conduct warrantless arrests or searches and seizures in terrorism cases 
without even reasonable suspicion.132  After twenty-four hours, if 
reasonable suspicion had not been developed the police had to release the 
suspect.133  If reasonable suspicion had developed, the RUC could hold 
the suspect for a further twenty-four hours after which time it had to 
charge or release him.134  This forty-eight-hour period before the suspect 
had to be charged could be further extended to a maximum of seven 
days, however, with the approval of the Home Secretary.135  At no time 
during these seven days did the detainee have access to a neutral 
magistrate, and the detainee’s right to contact a solicitor or relative could 
be delayed indefinitely.136  Moreover, there was nothing to prevent the 
suspect from being re-arrested again concerning the same matter once the 
detention had ended.137  The process generally was used for information 
gathering, and of the 7052 people detained under the PTA between 1974 
and 1991, 6097 of them were released without charge.138 
At roughly the same time, before direct rule was reimposed from 
Britain, the Northern Irish Parliament introduced the hugely unpopular 
measure of internment.139  Suspected IRA leaders were rounded up and 
detained without charge.140  Internment widely was seen as promoting 
more political unrest than it solved, and the practice ultimately was 
abandoned in 1980.141 
The final piece of antiterrorism legislation introduced to Britain 
before 9/11, was the supposedly definitive Terrorism Act 2000.  Many 
believed that by passing the Act the British Government was bowing to 
the inevitability of an ongoing problem with terrorism and that unlike the 
                                                                                                                       
as providing the police with greater powers of arrest and detention, the PTA allowed for the 
exclusion of terror suspects from the British mainland.  Id. 
 132. Id. at 5. 
 133. Id. at 21. 
 134. Id. at 21–23. 
 135. Id. at 27. 
 136. Id. at 84. 
 137. See, e.g., Ex parte Lynch, N. Ir. L.R. 126 Q.B.  Lynch was arrested on suspicion of being a 
terrorist.  No charges were made and he was released.  Two days later he was arrested again for the 
same offense. 
 138. HILLYARD, supra note 127, at 5 n.15. 
 139. See, e.g., ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE, TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND 118 (1983) 
(discussing Britain’s internment policy in Northern Ireland). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Philip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Power: 9/11: USA and UK, 26 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1193, 1224 (2003). 
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earlier PTA and EPA, the Terrorism Act 2000 was intended to be 
semipermanent.142  Unlike earlier legislation, it did not require annual 
parliamentary review, and it was streamlined to be the sole responsibility 
of the Home Secretary.143  The Act compiled and extended the police’s 
existing powers and specifically related them to the specter of 
international terrorism, rather than just the narrower scope of domestic 
terrorism.144 
D. Developing Antiterrorism Law in the United Kingdom Since 9/11 
1. The ATCSA 
Although not the target of 9/11 and with the ink barely dry on the 
supposedly definitive Terrorism Act 2000, the United Kingdom reacted 
to the attacks with its own harsher, new antiterrorism legislation.145  The 
ATCSA gave the government far-reaching powers of detention similar to 
those established in the United States even though the United Kingdom 
was not involved in military action abroad and despite criticism by some 
British judges and members of Parliament of the treatment of prisoners at 
Guantanamo Bay.146  The scope of the U.K. legislation may have been 
narrower than the U.S. legislation—the danger of indefinite detention 
extended only to noncitizens who could not be deported under Article 3 
of the ECHR, because of the possibility that they would be tortured upon 
arrival147—but, for those affected, the threat was a very real one. 
Section 23 of the ATCSA allowed for the detention of a “suspected 
international terrorist . . . despite the fact that his removal or departure 
from the United Kingdom is prevented (whether temporarily or 
indefinitely).”148  Certification as a terror suspect under the ATCSA is 
based entirely upon the reasonable suspicion of the Home Secretary.149  
The definition of “terrorist” is disconcertingly broad.  A terrorist is 
defined as, inter alia, someone who “has links with an international 
                                                     
 142. Keith, supra note 25, at 431–32. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Williams, supra note 8, at 693. 
 146. Clare Dyer, Law Lord Castigates U.S. Justice: Guantanamo Bay Detainees Facing Trial by 
Kangaroo Court, THE GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 26, 2003, at 9 (describing Lord Steyn’s branding 
of Guantanamo Bay as “a monstrous failure of justice”). 
 147. Thomas, supra note 141, at 1218. 
 148. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23 (Eng.), available at http://www. 
opsi.gov.UK/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm. 
 149. Id. § 21(1). 
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terrorist group,” and “ha[ving] links with” an international terrorist group 
is further defined as “support[ing] or assist[ing]” it.150 
To enact the ATCSA, Britain was required to derogate from Article 
5 of the ECHR.151  Although Article 5 allows signatory countries to 
detain “a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the 
country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to 
deportation or extradition,”152 it does not allow for the indefinite 
detention of one against whom deportation action is being taken.  Article 
15 of the ECHR, however, allows member countries to derogate from 
most articles “[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation.”153  Even then, the government can only take such 
action as is consistent with “the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation.”154  The European Court on Human Rights in the past 
has ruled in Britain’s favor on such issues, but only in cases involving 
actual terrorist campaigns against the United Kingdom.155  By derogating 
from Article 5, Britain believed it could hold the detainees for as long as 
it took to deport them—in real terms, this meant indefinitely. 
The ATCSA contains procedural safeguards to limit the possibility 
of civil rights abuses, but these lack any real bite.  According to the then-
Home Secretary, “[t]he detainees are free to leave the UK at any time—
they can go home or to any third country that will accept them.”156  
Although this may sound reasonable, other countries generally have 
shown reluctance to accept an individual the United Kingdom has 
certified as a terrorist, and as of January 2004, only two suspects were 
released to other countries.157  Realistically, the detainees’ only option 
was to appeal their certifications.  Following certification by the 
                                                     
 150. § 21(2), (4). 
 151. Id. § 30. 
 152. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5(1)(f), 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 153. Art. 15(1). Article 15(2) states that Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from torture), 4(1) 
(freedom from slavery or servitude), and (7) (a person cannot be convicted of something that was not 
a criminal offense at the time of commission) may not be derogated from. 
 154. Art. 15(1). 
 155. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978) (declaring the United 
Kingdom was justified in derogating from Article 15 to hold Irish terror suspects for longer than 
allowed under Article 5); Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, 34 (1961) (declaring the Irish 
Government was “justified in declaring that there was a public emergency in the Republic of Ireland 
threatening the life of the nation and were hence entitled, applying the provisions of Article 15(1) . . . 
to take measures derogating from their obligations under the Convention” to detain terrorism 
suspects without trial after the failure of the ordinary criminal law to contain the problem). 
 156. Press Release, Home Office, Special Immigration Appeals Comm’n Determination (Jan. 
27, 2004), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/n_story.asp?item_id=787. 
 157. Id. 
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Secretary of State, detainees had three months to appeal to the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).158  Failing appeal, the SIAC 
had to review the certification as soon as reasonably possible after six 
months, and every three months thereafter.159  If the SIAC determined 
there was “no reasonable grounds” for suspecting the detainee of 
terrorism, they had to release him.160  The SIAC, however, sits in secret 
and the detainee could not appear before it in person.161  Instead, a 
“security-cleared special advocate” argued the case.162  Moreover, the 
Government could produce evidence without the detainee or his counsel 
even seeing it.163  For the most part, the SIAC generally showed great 
deference to the Home Secretary’s certification, and it dismissed almost 
every appeal by detainees.164 
2. The cases of “M” and “G” 
The possibility that the certification and detention process could go 
wrong, however, first surfaced in several cases in which the SIAC 
determined there was insufficient evidence to justify the detention.  One 
detainee, identified only as M, was released without charge after sixteen 
months in Britain’s notorious Belmarsh prison.165  In harsh terms, the 
SIAC concluded that M was convicted on “unreliable” evidence, and that 
the Secretary of State had “exaggerated” his links to Al Qaeda.166  M 
claimed that he was not told of the reason for his detention until seven 
months after he was arrested and that none of the detainees had even 
been questioned by the intelligence services since being jailed.167  Not 
long after this, another detainee identified as G was released to house 
 
                                                     
 158. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 25 (Eng.), available at http://www. 
opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm. 
 159. Id. § 26. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Thomas, supra note 141, at 1218–19. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1123 [1] (Eng.) 
(dismissing the appeals of ten detainees certified as terror suspects and ruling that they should stay in 
prison and similarly refusing an appeal to dismiss the certification of two detainees who had been 
released to other countries). 
 165. Audrey Gillan, For Detainee M, Still no Explanation Why He Was Locked Up for 16 
Months: Terror Suspect Held Without Trial Feared He Would Stay in Prison Until He Died, THE 
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 23, 2004, at 4. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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arrest after becoming mentally ill because of the conditions of his 
detention.168 
3. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
The most striking blow to the British government’s detention 
procedures came in December 2004 with the House of Lords’ ruling on 
the appeals of the remaining detainees.  The appellants, foreign nationals 
of various countries, had been certified and detained under the ATCSA at 
the same time as G and M.169  They duly appealed their certification to 
the SIAC, which affirmed the certification.170  On appeal, the court 
considered each detainee individually and affirmed all the certifications, 
finding that, in each instance, the Home Secretary had reasonable 
suspicion for certifying the individual.171  On the issue of whether 
Britain’s derogation from the ECHR was valid, the court also upheld the 
government’s position that a present emergency existed: “The threat to 
the nation, which underlies the derogation, is posed by any of the various 
activities of Al Qa’eda and those who are associated with it.”172  The 
detainees’ appeals were dismissed.173 
The detainees appealed to the House of Lords on the sole issue of 
whether Britain’s derogation from the ECHR was valid.174  The Lords 
considered the appeal in two stages: they asked first whether there was a 
valid “public emergency threatening the life of the nation within the 
meaning of Article 15(1)” and second whether the derogation was 
consistent with the extent “strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.”175  The Lords found it “puzzling” that Britain was “the only 
country to have found it necessary to derogate” from the ECHR when it 
was “clear that other countries face considerable threats from terrorists 
within their borders,” but were willing to show deference to the 
government in making such a decision.176  The judgment required 
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“making a factual prediction of what various people around the world 
might or might not do, and when (if at all) they might do it, and what the 
consequences might be if they did.”177  As such, the Home Secretary was 
in a better position to make such a judgment, and “[i]t would have been 
irresponsible not to err, if at all, on the side of safety.”178 
On the issue of proportionality, however, the Lords held against the 
government, citing three main concerns with the detention provisions of 
the ATCSA: 
(a) [they] did not address the threat presented by UK nationals, (b) 
[they] permitted foreign nationals suspected of being Al-Qa’ida 
terrorists or their supporters to pursue their activities abroad if there 
was any country to which they were able to go, and (c) the sections 
permitted the certification and detention of persons who were not 
suspected of presenting any threat to the security of the United 
Kingdom as Al-Qa’ida terrorists or supporters.179 
Given that the SIAC had heard evidence of “upwards of a thousand 
individuals from the UK . . . [who] attended training camps in 
Afghanistan in the last five years” the terrorist threat could hardly be said 
to come only from foreign nationals, the sole subject of the derogation 
order.180  As such, the derogation was discriminatory. 
Moreover, the provision allowing detainees to voluntarily leave for 
another country argued against their being especially dangerous: 
“allowing a suspected international terrorist to leave our shores and 
depart to another country . . . , there to pursue his criminal designs, is 
hard to reconcile with a belief in his capacity to inflict serious injury to 
the people and interests of this country.”181  Finally, allowing the 
detention of someone suspected of having “links” to a terrorist 
organization, “irrespective of its presenting a direct threat to public 
security in the United Kingdom and perhaps, therefore, of no relation to 
the emergency originally requiring the legislation” suggested the 
detention provisions were not a proportional response.182  The Lords 
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further noted that the problem stemmed at least in part from “the choice 
of an immigration measure to address a security problem.”183  In short, 
trying to adapt existing legislation to combat a new problem resulted in 
more problems than it solved.  The government would be better served 
by creating new legislation specifically tailored to the threat it faced. 
In conclusion, the Lords “strongly recommend[ed]” that the 
legislation allowing “foreign nationals to be detained potentially 
indefinitely should be replaced as a matter of urgency.”184  Despite 
stating that legislation was outside the province of the courts, the Lords 
felt strongly enough to suggest potential revisions: “New legislation 
should: (a) deal with all terrorism, whatever its origin or the nationality 
of its suspected perpetrators; and (b) not require a derogation from the 
European Convention on Human Rights.”185 
Following the Lords’ decision, the government proposed new 
legislation abolishing the detention provisions of the ATCSA and 
replacing them with “control orders” to monitor the activities of 
terrorism suspects.186  Measures would range in severity from curfews, 
through electronic tagging, to indefinite house arrest.187  More 
importantly, the measures would apply equally to British citizens as well 
as noncitizens.188  The eight remaining detainees were released in March 
2005 with control orders to be served on them all “including partial 
house arrest with a nighttime curfew, tagging and a ban on meeting 
anybody not approved by the home secretary.”189  Control orders remain 
controversial, and the government already has delayed its decision on 
whether to renew the legislation—slated to expire in March 2006—until 
further study of their efficacy can be made.190 
The July 2005 bombings in London also have prompted further 
legislation, with Tony Blair announcing that “[t]he rules of the game are 
changing.”191  In place of indefinite detention, deportation now plays a 
key role, with the majority of those released from Belmarsh being forced 
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to leave the country.192  To counter concerns that such actions will result 
in those exact violations of the ECHR that the previous scheme of 
detentions were intended to prevent, the government sought “assurances” 
from the receiving countries that the deportees would not be tortured 
upon their return.193  Foreseeing probable legal challenges to such action, 
however, the government stated it was prepared to “legislate further, 
including, if necessary[,] amending the Human Rights Act.”194  Future 
antiterrorism legislation would include a new offense of “condoning or 
glorifying terrorism.”195 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Case for Continuing Existing Procedure 
There are strong reasons behind the American and British 
governments’ desires for strong legislation to deal with the threat of 
terror.  The stakes are high in terrorist cases, as the attacks in New York 
and London demonstrated.  The ordinary criminal law, often concerned 
with the punishment of offenses rather than their prevention, is singularly 
unsuited to stop terrorist acts before they occur.  Moreover, the deterrent 
value of any such punishment is likely to be negligible, if any.  Ordinary 
criminal law falls short for a number of reasons.  First, rules of evidence 
are generally not suited to collecting information until after the crime has 
been committed.  Further, what little evidence may exist before 
commission of the crime likely will take longer to amass, hence the need 
for longer detention periods.  Second, when a country’s military is 
fighting on the other side of the world, it does not have the luxury of 
providing individualized hearings to determine whether the people it has 
detained are likely to again attempt to kill them immediately upon 
release.  Third, trials of such terror suspects may revolve around highly 
sensitive information, which may potentially endanger the military if 
revealed.  With so much at stake, the argument goes, it is better to err on 
the side of caution: detain people first and determine their innocence 
later.  This argument is bolstered by the temporary nature of most 
antiterror laws.  For example, as described above, Lincoln was able to 
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suspend habeas relief and it was reintroduced as soon as the Civil War 
ended.196 
Moreover, both countries have attempted to provide at least some 
procedural protection for their detainees.  The U.S. government, 
acknowledging the holding in Hamdi, has granted many detainees access 
to Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), conducted by military 
commission.197  Further, the Court in Hamdi indirectly suggested his 
detention was only justified so long as hostilities were ongoing in 
Afghanistan.198  Likewise, in the United Kingdom, people certified and 
detained as terrorists under the ATCSA had their certifications reviewed 
at regular intervals, albeit by a specially appointed secret court.199  In 
addition, the ATCSA’s detention provisions had a built-in expiration date 
and were allowed to expire.200  Even before that, had either the 
government or the European Court of Human Rights decided that the 
period of “national emergency” justifying Britain’s derogation from the 
ECHR had ended, the detentions would likewise have had to end.  
Previous similar derogations from the ECHR were declared valid by the 
European Court because of the presence of similar safeguards.201 
B. The Case for Rethinking Existing Procedure 
Many commentators and civil liberties groups despaired at the lack 
of real debate within each country’s legislature before they passed the 
respective bills.  Both were rushed through the legislatures in a matter of 
weeks, with no real chance for discussion or review, cobbled together 
from a series of new laws and amendments to existing statutes.202  Yet 
their impact was far reaching: in particular, the Joint Resolution’s 
extraordinary breadth was used to justify the indefinite detention of 
hundreds without trial.  At times of crisis, public anxiety is 
overwhelmingly high, and governments understandably feel that they 
must be seen doing something to allay the public concern.  For example, 
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the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 was 
rushed through the British Parliament in a similar way following a series 
of pub bombings in Birmingham, England.203  As one Member of 
Parliament opined at the time: 
“The justification for the Bill to my mind, is overwhelming, and I make 
no bones about the fact that I shall not listen with too much patience to 
any anxieties about whether this or that or the other civil right may 
temporarily be somewhat abridged . . . . The overwhelming mood in 
my constituency and I believe in my city, is one of vengeance.”204 
Legislation should not be developed through a feeling of “vengeance.”  
Reprehensible though the actions are, feelings of revenge and destruction 
are likely to override competing concerns about civil rights in the heat of 
the moment. 
Four years removed from the events of 9/11, it is easier to cast a 
more critical eye at the legislation passed in response to the attacks.  
Notorious cases such as Hamdi may make it all the way to the Supreme 
Court, but there are less-reported cases that suggest a need for reform.  
Take, for example, the case of Purna Raj Bajracharya, arrested as a 
suspected terrorist in 2001 for accidentally videotaping a Federal Bureau 
of Investigations building in Queens, New York.205  The arresting officer 
decided within days that Bajracharya was only guilty of overstaying a 
tourist visa, but he was unable to prevent Bajracharya from being held in 
solitary confinement for three months until Bajracharya’s eventual 
deportation.206  Rasul, in the case bearing his name, confessed in 
interrogation to meeting with bin Laden, but has since been released to 
Britain, along with three other detainees, after British intelligence 
verified that at the time the alleged meeting took place Rasul actually 
was working at an electronics store in the United Kingdom.207  It may be 
difficult to determine how effective the legislation is in preventing acts 
of terrorism, but it is easy to see the civil rights abuses it causes. 
The civil rights abuses stem from a number of underlying problems 
in U.S. and U.K. law.  First, neither country has satisfactorily defined 
“terrorist.”  The U.S. government has argued in applying the Detention 
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Order that where it is “undisputed” that a detainee was captured in an 
active zone of combat, no further factual inquiry is necessary to justify 
his detention.208  This Detention Order could as easily result in the 
detention of aid workers and innocent civilians as those intent on 
destroying America, however.  If the United States, as in Hamdi, applies 
a similar presumption to those detained by allied forces, such as the 
Northern Alliance, with an agenda of their own, the likelihood of 
innocents being wrongly detained is only exacerbated.  Likewise, under 
the ATCSA, the definition of what constitutes “terrorism” is 
extraordinarily broad and may lead to the detainment of people not 
commonly understood to be terrorists.209  Following the July 2005 
bombings in London, the Prime Minister stated that “[a]ctive 
engagement” with any of a list of “specific extremist websites, 
bookshops, centres, networks and particular organisations” would trigger 
deportation proceedings, without further defining “active” 
engagement.210 
Second, detentions in both countries are indefinite.  Under the 
ATCSA, foreign terror suspects were held until they could be deported to 
another country.  The ECHR, of which Britain is a signatory member, 
forbids the deportation of people to countries where they will likely face 
death or torture, and few countries are likely to accept certified terrorists.  
Thus, the detainees faced indefinite detention, even if they were 
supposedly “free to leave” as the Home Secretary commented.  Now they 
are just deported without being able to appeal until after removal from 
the country.  Deportation can only serve as a quick fix, however, as it 
would leave any terrorist free to pursue his activities in another country, 
and further fails to solve the problem of citizen terrorists.  Similarly, 
under the Joint Resolution, people such as Hamdi are held “for the 
duration of the conflict” without satisfactorily defining “the conflict.”  
Such an amorphous concept as the War on Terror may conceivably never 
end, and detaining people for the duration may amount to a life sentence 
without trial. 
Third, although the government now allows the Guantanamo 
detainees access to a CSRT, and the ATCSA has always provided for 
review of a detainee’s certification as a terrorist, in neither instance does 
the detainee have access to a truly neutral decision maker to question his 
confinement.  At least one district court already has found CSRTs to be 
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incompatible with military law,211 and under the ATCSA, the 
certification was reviewed at a secret trial that the detainee himself was 
unable to attend. 
These concerns might seem less serious if British history did not 
belie the “temporary” nature of antiterrorist legislation.  The EPA, for 
example, was designed to last for just two years, and instead Parliament 
renewed or extended it without question for twenty-seven years.212  
There were three major reviews of the PTA in Britain between its 
implementation and 1991.  All three started with the phrase “Accepting 
the continuing need for legislation against terrorism” and were tasked by 
people closely associated with the government.213  Such temporary 
legislation, intended to combat an emergency situation, has a habit of 
becoming the common state of affairs, which in turn affects the 
development of the regular criminal law.214  Likewise, papers released in 
the United States in January 2005 under the Freedom of Information Act 
reveal that the U.S. government had been contemplating terrorist threats 
much like the events of 9/11 since the 1970s—a time frame that further 
suggests the situation is anything but temporary.215 
Like the EPA and the PTA before it, the ATCSA had a built-in 
expiration date.  Like its predecessors, however, the Act likely would 
have been renewed by Parliament with little real discussion were it not 
for the Lords’ recent ruling.  Even now it is only the detention provisions 
that have been stricken, and the worryingly vague definition of terrorism 
remains. 
Finally, there is the personal toll such detention puts on people 
detained under these laws.  The case of G’s nervous breakdown after two 
years in solitary confinement is far from unique.216  One author’s study 
of the effects of the PTA on Irish detainees provides ample evidence of 
the effect just a few days’ detention had upon the people detained.  One 
interviewee stated, 
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“I was stripped of my rights as a citizen.  They can do what they like, 
tell you what they like.  I felt I had no rights whatsoever. . . .  These 
people don’t believe you are telling the truth, even if you are telling the 
truth; they just don’t believe you.  As far as they are concerned, you are 
a terrorist, you are a 100 per cent terrorist.”217 
The cost to innocent people wrongly detained in terms of their physical 
and mental well-being and the effects on their family and friends—not to 
mention their employment and finances—is documented on a 
disturbingly regular basis.  Since those captured in Afghanistan were first 
brought to Guantanamo, there have been thirty-four reported suicide 
attempts by the detainees, culminating in ten simultaneous attempts on a 
single day in 2003.218 
The other major concern is the erosion of faith in the workings of 
justice that unjustified detentions cause.  Where the law is undecided and 
conflicting, it may be perceived as arbitrary and capricious.  The 
problems this may cause for a country such as the United States, which 
holds itself up as a prime example of democracy at work, should be 
apparent. 
While it is easy to list the numerous ways in which antiterrorism 
legislation impinges on civil liberties with disturbing results, it is not so 
easy to see the ways in which it may already have prevented further acts 
of terrorism.  It is likely that many of those held at Guantanamo did 
indeed fight against the United States, rather than serve as innocent aid 
workers, as many of them claimed.  The law as it stood in 2001 was 
unable to prevent the attacks on the World Trade Center, but it is 
impossible to gauge whether the Joint Resolution or other legislation, 
such as the USA PATRIOT Act, will do any better.  “[E]ach new attack 
tends to raise a presumption of ineffectiveness in relation to existing and 
earlier measures of legal control (how else to explain [the attack’s] 
occurrence?).”219  Perhaps it is time to admit that the situation is too 
ongoing to be characterized as an “emergency” and that any “temporary” 
abrogation of our civil rights is in fact going to be ongoing.  As such, 
antiterrorism legislation needs to be refined and debated now by 
Congress when competing interests can fairly be balanced, rather than in 
the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack when feelings run high and 
the country calls out for “vengeance.” 
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The holding handed down by the Supreme Court in Hamdi is a good 
one.  The government does need to be able to detain people in certain 
circumstances that the ordinary criminal law does not allow.  To hold 
such people for several years without charge, however, and without the 
ability to challenge their detentions is unreasonable.  Procedural 
safeguards are needed to ensure such detentions do not happen in the 
future.  It should not be left to the courts to influence the development of 
the law in a case-by-case, and often contradictory, manner.  Making laws 
is the province of the legislature, which can provide a more coherent and 
legitimate body of law.  Laws also can be created afresh to deal with the 
new and unique threat that international terrorism in the twenty-first 
century presents.  The following section suggests minimum reforms 
needed to balance the competing needs of individual rights and national 
security. 
C. Toward Balancing Detainee Rights 
Both the Joint Resolution and the ATCSA give the executive wide 
latitude in determining who may be detained as a terrorist.220  A tighter 
definition of terrorism is needed if the standard is not to be so broad that 
it encompasses acts that would normally be contained within the rubric 
of the regular criminal law.  Otherwise, innocent people may be certified 
as terrorists and unscrupulous prosecutors given the incentive to read the 
definition broadly in an attempt at an end-run around the regular criminal 
law. 
As a starting point, The American Heritage Dictionary gives a better 
definition of “terrorism”: “The unlawful use or threatened use of force or 
violence by a person or an organized group against people or property 
with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, 
often for ideological or political reasons.”221  Moreover, the ATCSA’s 
loose definition of “having links to” a terrorist organization must be 
defined more tightly than just “supporting” it.  Morally reprehensible 
though it may be, we cannot imprison someone just for sympathizing 
with bin Laden.  “Providing material assistance or support” would help 
meet that threshold, with the courts able to decide what constitutes 
“material support” in a given case.  “Active” engagement with 
proscribed Web sites and bookstores needs also to be defined carefully 
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so the noncitizen student writing a paper on religious extremism, for 
example, does not get labeled a terrorist and deported. 
Congress must decide when and how to apply the threshold 
distinction between charging someone as a terrorist in a criminal court—
in which case criminal procedure should be adapted to dictate how long a 
person can be held without charge—and holding someone for the 
duration of a war to prevent him from rejoining the enemy, in which case 
the detainee still needs the ability to meaningfully challenge his 
classification as an enemy combatant.222  The government simply cannot 
refuse to either try a detainee as a terrorist or unilaterally declare the 
detainee an enemy combatant, and attempt to hold him indefinitely in a 
legal vacuum until the courts force a policy change—particularly if the 
government’s response to the court’s decision is simply to find some way 
to subvert it and continue to hold the detainee pending the next adverse 
decision.  Previous cases relied on by the government, such as Quirin, 
involved petitioners who freely admitted they were hostile to the United 
States, and so could be held for the duration of the conflict and possibly 
tried by military commission for war crimes.  Few of the Guantanamo 
detainees have made such admissions, and the President’s classification 
needs to be scrutinized by a court when the basis of their detention is 
disputed. 
Regardless of whether the detainees are to be tried as criminals or 
simply held as enemy combatants, there needs to be a threshold level of 
evidence met before a person can even be detained on suspicion of 
terrorism.  The danger of inaction is indeed great, so the “probable 
cause” standard is too demanding, and should be replaced with the lower 
“reasonable suspicion” standard so as to err on the side of caution.223  
Furthermore, as stated in Hamdi,224 presumptions may operate in the 
government’s favor, such as against a person intercepted in the vicinity 
of a foreign battlefield carrying a weapon.  The mere presence of a 
person in the area alone, however, should be insufficient given the strong 
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possibility of detaining innocent civilians and aid workers.  Military 
personnel cannot be recalled from fighting around the globe to give such 
evidence, so a brief affidavit would suffice. 
As with the warrant requirement, whether a prima facie case of 
terrorism exists is a decision that should be made by a neutral decision 
maker.  The Executive may be the best informed, but it can hardly be 
considered neutral when it consists of politicians, such as the Home 
Secretary, heavily invested in the War on Terror, often with their careers 
dependent in part on the number of terrorists they are seen to capture.  
Moreover, if certified rather than captured on a battlefield, the 
certification should be reviewed at regular intervals by a similarly neutral 
decisionmaker, and not by the person issuing the certification in the first 
place. 
The value of many of the detainees at Guantanamo has been their 
intelligence value, rather than the suspicion that they are involved in an 
imminent attack.  Once captured, however, there should be a limit on 
how long the detainee can be interrogated before access to a lawyer is 
granted.  Because critical intelligence may be gained from a suspect 
before a lawyer is appointed or the suspect is apprised of his rights, a 
delay longer than that granted in regular criminal law may be 
appropriate, but the delay should be measured in days rather than 
weeks.225  Information gleaned during this time could then be used to 
apprehend other terrorists, or even prevent attacks, but it should not be 
admissible at trial or in front of a military commission against the 
detainee unless he knowingly waived this right.  The detainee should not 
have to wait several years in confinement while his habeas petition is 
heard, overturned, appealed, and reversed by various courts.  To prevent 
a recurrence of Padilla, the place to bring a habeas petition contesting 
detentions as either a terror suspect or enemy combatant should clearly 
be prescribed by statute.  The Supreme Court declared it to be the 
“immediate custodian” in Padilla,226 but this may lead to future cases in 
which detainees are unable to bring habeas petitions because the 
immediate custodian is a foreign national running an American prison 
abroad.  Thus, the statute should be amended to allow the Secretary of 
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mistreatment by the captors will still be visible to the arraigning judge.  See Report of the Joseph R. 
Crowley Program/Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: Joint 1998 Mission to Turkey, Special 
Report, Justice on Trial: State Security Courts, Police Impunity, and the Intimidation of Human 
Rights Defenders in Turkey, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2129, 2153 (1999). 
 226. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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Defense to be a named recipient where the Defense Department is 
ultimately responsible for the detention. 
At any arraignment, military commission, or habeas hearing, the 
charges against the detainee should be explained in a manner sufficient 
for the detainee to understand the case against him and afford him a 
meaningful opportunity to formulate a defense.  The detainee should also 
be appointed a lawyer.  The average American would have little chance 
of successfully negotiating his way through a case against him—a 
foreign detainee with limited English ability and no knowledge of the 
American legal system would find doing so nearly impossible.  The 
detainee should then be afforded regular access to the lawyer, but, for 
security purposes, this access need not be unmonitored.227  To prevent 
the added burden, cost, and security risks of transporting a detainee from 
a foreign prison to a domestic court, such access to a tribunal could be by 
way of video conference.  Moreover, as mentioned above, it is unrealistic 
to expect military personnel to appear for cross examination by the 
detainee, even by video conference, so the right to cross examination 
must be similarly limited. 
If the suspect is to be tried in the criminal system, there is no reason 
why the trial cannot continue at a pace similar to that in regular criminal 
trials, with some modifications.  Indeed, before 9/11, all terrorism cases 
in the United States were tried in federal court,228 and the government 
has chosen to try some of the easier terrorist cases since 9/11 in federal 
court.229  Treating terrorism as a crime rather than a war also allows the 
United States to retain the moral high ground in the fight against 
terrorism: They may attack us, but we do not reciprocate with arbitrary 
bombing campaigns, perhaps killing innocents.  We “bring them in 
alive,” convict them fairly, and show the rest of the world the principles 
of justice at work.  Moreover, this method attaches greater moral 
condemnation to the acts of terrorism: crimes are carried out by 
criminals; wars by warriors. 
As with the regular criminal law, the right to appeal should also be 
given as a matter of right to every defendant.  By standardizing the law 
                                                     
 227. The Bureau of Prisons, for example, already has a system in place for monitoring attorney-
client contact where “there is a substantial risk that a prisoner’s communications or contacts with 
persons could result in death or serious bodily injury to persons, or substantial damage to property 
that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons.”  28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2005). 
 228. For example, in United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the trial of 
the 1993 bombers of the World Trade Center led to their conviction in regular criminal court. 
 229. John Walker Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban,” and Richard Reid, the “Shoe 
Bomber,” have both been convicted this way. Butterfield, supra note 180; Neil A. Lewis, Lindh Plea 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 2. 
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regarding the detention and trial of terrorism suspects, far fewer appeals 
will be sustained.  Further, the law would achieve more consistency by 
avoiding the decision-prompted flurry of filings and governmental 
responses meant to delay the day of reckoning.  Moreover, by reducing 
litigation posturing the legislation would reduce the time the detainees 
languish in indefinite confinement. 
Finally, as Rasul shows, the law should not distinguish between 
citizens and noncitizens insofar as both should have the ability to bring a 
habeas petition.230  If detainees are confined by U.S. forces they should 
not be prevented from challenging their detentions on the sole ground 
that they themselves are not American or are not detained on American 
soil and, as such, have no constitutional rights.  The decision in Rasul is 
a good one, although sadly capable of being read too narrowly to deny 
noncitizen detainees further meaningful access to the courts.231  It seems 
improbable that the Supreme Court would hold that noncitizens are 
allowed to bring actions challenging their detentions in federal court, 
while intending that the courts be unable to hear them.  Moreover, as A v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department demonstrates above, when a 
law discriminates between terror detainees on the basis of nationality, it 
holds the law up to charges of discrimination which may well lead to its 
being overturned and potentially genuine terrorists walking free.232  It 
also prevents the government from detaining genuine terrorists where 
they happen to be citizens.  Nationality may be pertinent to the issue of 
immigration and defining the full spectrum of detainees’ rights, but the 
right to appeal detentions without charge by the Executive should not be 
one of them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Given that the War on Terror is likely to be an ongoing, near-
permanent state of affairs—at least for the foreseeable future—
temporary, “emergency” legislation, created hurriedly at a time of 
heightened national emergency is unsuited to maintaining the delicate 
balance between national security interests and human rights.  The 
present state of the law allows for the indefinite detention of people who 
may or may not be terrorists with no ability to challenge their detentions, 
and a steady trickle of releases ordered by the courts on a case-by-case 
                                                     
 230. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text. 
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basis.  Instead we need a new framework of custom-made legislation, 
created in a time of relative calm, to combat the unique realities of 
twenty-first century international terrorism.  While a sweeping overhaul 
of antiterrorism legislation is beyond the scope of this Article, at a 
minimum, new legislation needs to (1) be permanent; (2) allow terror 
suspects the meaningful opportunity to challenge their detentions or 
certifications in front of a neutral decision maker; and (3) be applied 
equally to citizen and noncitizen alike.  Then national security interests 
will not be compromised unduly, and individual human rights will not be 
trampled. 
